This paper revisits the Atkinson-Stiglitz result on uselessness of commodity taxation in the presence of optimal non-linear income taxation in a more general setup, namely when tastes are heterogeneous. This general analysis displays the key economic assumptions under which the Atkinson-Stiglitz result is robust. A small tax on a given commodity is desirable if high income earners have a relatively higher taste for this commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure. An application to the case of savings suggests that, even in the presence of optimal non-linear earnings taxation, there is a role for a supplemental capital income tax in the standard overlapping generation model.
Introduction
Taxation is a key instrument in the hands of the government to redistribute among individuals. Assessing the power of differential commodity taxation versus nonlinear income taxation for redistribution is a central tax policy question which has attracted much attention in the literature on optimal taxation. The role of differential commodity taxation has been severely undermined by the influential paper of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) . They showed that, under a condition of separability of leisure and consumption choices, optimal non-linear income taxation makes commodity taxation useless. This result, applied to dynamic models, has provided a strong theoretical argument against the use of capital income taxation in the presence of nonlinear taxation of wage income.
Atkinson and Stiglitz derived their result in a way that made economic interpretation difficult. A number of studies by Mirrlees (1976) , Christiansen (1984) , and Konishi (1995) , have tried to understand in more depth the AtkinsonStiglitz result. Mirrlees (1976) showed that commodity taxation is desirable on goods that are relatively more preferred by the high skilled individuals. Christiansen (1984) showed that goods that are complementary with leisure should be taxed. However, all these studies have considered the Atkinson-Stiglitz result in a context of strong homogeneity of preferences for consumption goods. Namely, they considered models where all individuals would buy exactly the same bundle of goods when provided with the same amount of disposable income.
This strong homogeneity in tastes for goods is clearly unrealistic and the goal of this paper is to investigate how the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem can be adapted to the case of heterogeneous consumption preferences. This improves previous findings on two grounds. First, considering the general case of heterogeneous tastes displays the conditions under which the Atkinson-Stiglitz result is robust. Second, the stringent homogeneity assumptions considered by previous studies obscure the economic mechanism behind the Atkinson-Stiglitz result. Considering the general case clarifies the key economic assumptions necessary to obtain the result and allows perhaps a more transparent interpretation.
A number of studies have examined optimal income and commodity taxation in the context of two skill types and have obtained a simpler economic interpretation of the Atkinson-Stiglitz result in that particular case. Stiglitz (1982) showed that when leisure and goods are separable, differential taxation of commodities cannot be used as a basis of separation of the two types and is thus sub-optimal. Naito (1999) obtained a similar interpretation and showed that the Atkinson-Stiglitz result breaks down when wages and prices are endogenous.
Recently, Cremer et al. (2000) have investigated the role of commodity taxation in a discrete type model with optimal income taxation. Their important innovation is to consider a situation where individuals also differ along their initial endowment. This second source of heterogeneity can be seen as a first step toward the general case considered in the present paper. Cremer et al. (2000) note that, in their model, separability is no longer enough to obtain the Atkinson-Stiglitz result. They do not, however, investigate the conditions necessary to restore the Atkinson-Stiglitz result which is the focus of the present paper. They center instead their analysis on the size of optimal commodity taxes. Their study can therefore be considered as complementary to the present paper.
The present paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 investigates and discusses the conditions under which no commodity taxation is desirable. The present method of analysis generalizes the original method of Christiansen (1984) . A brief application to the case of the taxation of savings is presented in Section 4. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
The model
Individuals are indexed by h belonging to a possibly multi-dimensional index set *. To simplify notation, I use the symbol o to denote summation over all h individuals even though * should be thought as a continuum. The total number of individuals is normalized to one. There are K consumption goods and labor h supply. Individual utility is denoted by U (c, z) where c 5 (c ,.., c ) is the vector 1 K 1 of consumption goods and z is earnings. I denote by p the vector of before tax prices of goods. The government sets a non-linear income tax on earnings T(z). I denote by t the vector of tax rates on goods and q 5 p 1 t the after tax commodity h prices. Individuals maximize utility U (c, z) subject to the budget constraint q ? c # z 2 T(z). The individual choice of consumption goods on the one hand and the labor supply choice on the other hand play a key role in the problem we investigate. Therefore, as in Christiansen (1984) , I decompose this maximization into two parts: first, the choice of consumption goods c and second, the labor choice z.
Consumption choice
Assume that a given individual h supplies labor in order to earn a given income level z and is given an amount R to spend on the K goods. That individual would 
(.).
Assume that the government does not use commodity taxation ( p 5 q) and implements an income tax T(.) so as to maximize a weighted sum of individual
In the original formulation of the optimal non-linear income tax problem by Mirrlees (1971) The following analysis relies critically on small variations around the optimal tax schedule. Therefore, I assume that the number of individuals is large enough so that average consumption demands by earnings levels are smooth functions of earnings.
More importantly, in order to apply standard calculus of variations, it is necessary to assume that the optimal income tax schedule is regular and that there is no bunching nor gaps in the optimal schedule. Without this assumption, a small variation in the income tax could produce discrete jumps in quantities consumed or supplied and the first order analysis would be invalidated. Christiansen (1984) and Konishi (1995) also made their analysis assuming smooth income tax schedules. The conditions necessary to obtain a smooth income tax schedule in the onedimensional skill distribution model they consider has been extensively analyzed (see notably Mirrlees, 1976; Seade, 1977) . The case of multi-dimensional skill characteristics considered in this paper has been much less studied. The small literature on multi-dimensional screening models has shown that it is difficult to obtain general assumptions insuring that the optimal tax schedule is smooth (seé for example the analysis of Rochet and Chone, 1998 ). The present paper will nevertheless ignore completely this issue and make the strong assumption of a smooth schedule.
When does commodity taxation improve welfare?
I assume from now on that the income tax schedule T(.) is optimal and smooth as described previously. In order to see whether a commodity taxation improves welfare, I consider, as in Christiansen (1984) , the introduction of a small tax dt 1 on (say) commodity 1. This small tax reform has three effects on welfare and tax revenue. where C denotes aggregate consumption of good 1.
1 Second, the tax has a negative welfare effect on individuals consuming good 1.
h Using Roy's identity, the welfare effect on individual h is equal to v dt 5 2
The total welfare effect expressed in terms of the value of public funds is
(1)
Last, changing price q produces a behavioral labor supply response dz 5dt ≠z /
The commodity tax change dt and the income
tax change dT induce the same mechanical effect on tax revenue: dM 5 dM .
The welfare effect for individual h is equal to
The total welfare effect due to the income tax change is therefore
I denote by dz the behavioral response of earnings due to the income tax change.
T
Thus the total loss in tax revenue due to the behavioral response to the income tax change is
The total welfare effect on the commodity tax is decomposed into two terms. The first term is the pure welfare effect and the second term is the behavioral effect. Commodity taxation can improve welfare if either of these two terms is non zero. people with the same total income but with no medical expenses. In the model considered by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and by subsequent studies, there is only one individual at each income level and thus no heterogeneity within income levels. As a result, Assumption 1 is always satisfied. Note finally h h that g and c are endogenous parameters and thus it would be difficult to specify general primitive conditions on intrinsic parameters insuring that Assumption 1 is true at the optimum. Nevertheless, if we want to model a government that does not want to discriminate between different consumption patterns, it seems reasonable to assume that the primitive conditions on utilities and social weights have been 3 specified so that Assumption 1 is true at the optimum.
Behavioral effect
The second reason why commodity taxation might be desirable is when the behavioral term in (5) is non zero. An important result in optimal income taxation states that, under weak assumptions, the optimal marginal tax rate is non-negative (that is, T 9(z) $ 0 for all z). Mirrlees (1971) presented this result and Seade (1982) clarified the conditions under which it is valid. This result is valid when leisure is a non-inferior good and when the government has redistributive tastes. We assume here that T 9(z) $ 0 for every z. Therefore, to sign the behavioral term, we must 
Lemma 1. The change in earnings dz for individual h induced by the small t 1 commodity tax dt is equal to the change in earnings induced by a small income
1 h h tax reform specific to individual h equal to dT (z) 5 c ( p, z 2 T(z), z) dt . 1 1 h h
Proof. Let us define dT (z) to be such that for any z, v (q 1 dt , z 2 T(z),
. Because these two functions are identical for all z, it must be the case that the value of z maximizing these two functions is identical.
h By assumption, z 1 dz maximizes v (q 1 dt , z 2 T(z), z). Therefore, it follows
. In other words, dz is also the t t 
(z), z).
A change in the tax schedule affects earnings z through income and substitution h effects. For a given individual, I denote by z (q, 1 2 t, R) the earnings level he would supply when facing prices q and a linear budget constraint with tax rate t 
c R
Proof. An arbitrary small income tax change P(z) dt produces a behavioral h h response dz in earnings due to income and substitution effects: dz 5 2
equal to 2 P9(z )dt 1 T 0(z )dz and routine computation shows that the income h h shock dR 2 z dt is equal to 2 P(z ) dt. Hence, Eq. (6) 
is obtained. h h h
Applying Lemma 2 to the income tax changes dT (z) 5 c dt and dT(z) 5 C (z)dt ,
we obtain the following expressions for dz and dz ,
We want to sum these two equations over all individuals with income z. Let E[ ? ] h denote expectation over all individuals h with income z 5 z. Eqs. (7) and (8) 4 imply,
H F G F GJ problem being satisfied. That is, the curvature of the indifference curve at the optimum labor supply choice is greater than the curvature of the budget constraint. Saez (2000) shows that this assumption is satisfied everywhere when the optimum income tax schedule is smooth which is the key assumption we made earlier on. and pulled out of the expectation operator. Intuitively, it is clear that if conditional on income, labor supply responses are highest for those with no taste for good 1, then taxation of good 1 does not affect these highly responsive individuals and is more efficient than the indiscriminate income tax change dT(z). Assumption 2 is obviously satisfied in the usual case considered by previous studies because they consider models with a single individual at each income level. This assumption does not hold in the general heterogeneous case. However, for most goods, there are no reasons to think that conditional on income, consumption patterns should be related systematically to substitution or income effects parameters. In any case, checking this condition empirically is difficult and thus it seems reasonable to assume that this condition holds. 
Assumption 3 is enough to ensure that E[dz ] 5 E[dz ]. In order to understand
That is, D C (z) captures the cross-sectional variation in consumption of good 1 Group A9 and group B have the same disposable income but individuals in group A9 have been forced to reduce their labor supply. Consumption of good 1 can differ across these two groups for two reasons.
First, group A9 is different from group B because they have higher incomes when they can freely choose their labor supply. If higher income earner individuals have relatively lower tastes for good 1, independently of disposable income, then group B consumes more good 1 than group A9. An example of such a good could 5 be cigarettes because, higher incomes tend to smoke less and this clearly cannot be due to the mechanical fact that they have higher disposable income.
Second, group A9 is different because it has been forced to reduce earnings and income effect R 5 z 2 T(z) from the leisure effect z. The income effect might be measured using longitudinal data but it is harder to see how to estimate the leisure effect. We can now state the generalized Atkinson-Stiglitz result, Proposition 1.
• If Assumptions 1,2 and 3 are satisfied for good 1, then commodity taxation of good 1 cannot improve welfare.
• If Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied but not Assumption 1, then taxation (resp. 
Application to the taxation of savings
The most fruitful and influential application of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem has been in the case where different goods are interpreted as consumption at different dates. When consumption and labor enter the utility function in a h separable way (that is, u 5 u(v(c , . . . , c ) , z, h), then there is no need to 1 T supplement a non-linear tax on earnings with a tax on interest income. This point was originally made by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) , and developed in Ordover and Phelps (1979) . It has been a major theoretical argument against the use of capital income tax. To simplify the discussion, let us consider the standard two period model where individuals work only in period 1 and live out of their savings in period 2. Utility functions are defined by u (c , c , z) . Following the long tradition in macro-1 2 economics, it tempting to specify a separable utility function such as,
where d is the discount rate and v(.) is a function capturing the disutility of effort. Specification (11) implies that commodity taxation (or equivalently interest income taxation) is useless in the presence of an optimal income tax. However, the key assumption embodied in specification (11) is not so much the separability assumption but rather that d (as well as u(.) and v(.)) are common to all individuals, that is, savings behavior is the same for every individual and independent of skills.
Using the framework of the present paper, in the presence of optimal nonlinear earnings taxation, the desirability of taxing interest income (or equivalently, taxing 7 consumption in period 2) hinges on whether Assumption 3 is true. However, propensities to save vary widely across the population and empirical studies have shown that savings rates are correlated with education even controlling for income (see for example, Lawrance, 1991) . Therefore, there is a strong presumption that higher income individuals save more not only because they have more income to save but also because they might have a better financial education and be more aware of the need to save for retirement. As a result, it is plausible to think that if individuals with high earnings z levels are forced to work less and thus earn z9 , z they would still have a higher taste for savings and thus save more than individuals with income z9. In terms of specification (11), the discount rate d is probably negatively correlated with skills. This suggests that interest income ought to be taxed even in the presence of a non-linear optimal earnings tax. Trying to quantify the optimal tax rate on interest income using data on tastes for savings by skill or income levels is an important but difficult task left for future research.
Conclusion
The key element to assess the desirability of commodity taxation in the presence of optimal income taxation is whether a small commodity tax can be replicated by a small income tax change. When this is not the case, commodity taxation is a tool that allows the government to expand its taxation power and is therefore desirable. This can happen either when the government uses social weights correlated with consumption patterns even conditioning on income or when patterns of consumption are related to intrinsic earning power or leisure choices. In that latter case, the desirability of commodity taxation hinges not on whether the commodity is consumed disproportionately by high earners but rather on whether individual demand for that good is less elastic than the cross-sectional demand pattern.
The analysis shows that the separability property might be misleading because what is central in the Atkinson-Stiglitz assumption is not so much that consumption and labor enter the individual utilities separately but rather the fact that all individuals share the same subutility of consumption. In contrast, separability does not intervene in the analysis of the general heterogeneous case and the present analysis shows directly the key economic assumptions needed. As an important caveat, it should be noted again that the present analysis is valid only when the optimal income tax schedule is assumed to be smooth. Singularities in the optimal income tax might change the present conclusions, though it is not clear whether 8 results based on singularities could be of much practical relevance.
It would of course be extremely useful to obtain optimal commodity tax formulas when the assumptions insuring the Atkinson-Stiglitz result are not satisfied. Cremer et al. (2000) take an important step in that direction in the context of a discrete type model with a simple structure. Obtaining such formulas expressed in terms of empirically estimable magnitudes in the general model considered here is an important task left for future research.
